

HOWARD KIMELDORF INTERVIEWS FOR *REDS OR RACKETS?*

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HARRY BRIDGES OF INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION

INTERVIEWEE: HARRY BRIDGES

INTERVIEWERS: HOWARD KIMELDORF

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[00:00:00] **HOWARD KIMELDORF:** Harry Bridges, February 25th, 1984.

[00:00:03] **HARRY BRIDGES:** In 1924—first of all, the union out here was busted up in the strike in 1919 [sic, 1916] . That was before I ever came to this country, you see. I didn't land until about 1920. And then, I went to sea, and finally came back to the West Coast in 1922 and went on the waterfront to work as a longshoreman for the latter part of 1922. 1924, the ILA [International Longshoremen's Association] charter, was issued by [Joseph P.] Ryan on the ILA on the East Coast, in San Francisco, the year 1924.

[00:00:49] **HOWARD:** I didn't realize it was that early, okay.

[00:00:51] **HARRY:** Well that was one. So that didn't get anywhere, because we had a strong company union then. The "blue book" union, the Bay Area Longshoremen Association, see. And that union was very powerful, and the new ILA union was not able to fight that company union [pause] effectively.

1924, '25, '26 were prosperous years on the waterfront. There was lots of work, incidentally. And at the time, it was the, the company union got a lot of support from the official Labor movement, the company union And eventually, there was a charter issued to it, by the Local Labor Council. Well, I must say that Ryan—now this was without Ryan's support or agreement, And he raised hell about it and got it canceled. Now this is 1924. Then the battle went on for the rest of the twenties, on the waterfront, trying to do certain things—I was a part of that, but it was kind of rank-and-file fights.

Now the Marine Workers Industrial Union, which was a Party, a Communist Party, so-called union, was very active. At the same time, a couple of organizations—one organization called the Trade Union Unity League, that which preached that the organization, that could be the AFL [American Federation of Labor] unions, the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] —no, there was no CIO—and the Party unions that there was unity in the whole AFL, regardless of your political beliefs, see. Of course, that was all—to unite the labor movement nationally there was a Trade Union Unity League and there was a Trade Union Education League. They were both Party organizations and they were very active. And this went on during all the twenties, till we come to the crash, the stock market crash in '28, see? So that borders the Depression. There was a lot of other activity. And then the—

[00:03:03] **HOWARD:** I have a question about the MWIU and those unions. Did they have much of an impact among the longshoremen at that time?

[00:03:08] **HARRY:** What the MWIU?

[00:03:09] **HOWARD:** Yeah.

[00:03:10] **HARRY:** Oh yes. But these longshoremen did not agree, you see. At that time. Now because the MWIU had a good program, which we aimed at later on a different way of the longshoremen and the seamen only in one union. And—but it wasn't the right thing to do. And we changed that around when we got going. And the unions really started organizing, probably in '32 onto '33 and so on, see. So that's the whole background. And Ryan did not oppose our organization. That is, organizing the union. Now there was a union, the local union being in existence all during the twenties, up in Tacoma. An ILA union and they had close contact with Joe Ryan. So that's how the whole thing came together. And Ryan, he supported the organization of the union all right. And issued the charters. But he was opposed to many of our politics, especially when we started something new in the union at that time. There had to be rank-and-file union all in control by the rank-and-file at all times. He didn't like that.

[00:04:28] **HOWARD:** No, of course not. Let me ask you a couple of questions, just before we get to the '34 strike area, the Albion Hall caucuses was studied an awful lot by the government, my interests are not the same by any means. [chuckles]

[00:04:41] **HARRY:** Who was that? What was that?

[00:04:42] **HOWARD:** The Albion Hall? Caucus within the ILA?

[00:04:46] **HARRY:** Oh that was our union!

[00:04:47] **HOWARD:** Yeah. Now—

[00:04:48] **HARRY:** Yeah, the Albion Hall, we set up a committee in 1933. I think it was '33, sure. Right in the middle of '33. We called ourselves the Committee of 500 [inaudible] to carry on the rank-and-file program in the unions. And to elect officers. And this committee used to be the Albion Hall, it was the Albion Hall

Committee. The Committee of 500, the rank-and-file committee—it was more like the Committee of 50, you see.

[00:05:19] **BRIDGES:** So the Committee of 500 was the same as the Albion Hall Caucus?

[00:05:22] **HARRY:** Yes, yes.

[00:05:23] **HOWARD:** Oh, I didn't realize that, okay.

[00:05:24] **HARRY:** It was a rank-and-file committee we set up, we took over the marine workers paper—I think it was the Waterfront Worker—and we took it over and started published that and this and there, published by a rank-and-file group. All that stuff, all that stuff was in our library, the union library.

[00:05:41] **HOWARD:** I've seen it, yeah.

[00:05:42] **HARRY:** Well alright, the Waterfront Worker.

[00:05:44] **HOWARD:** Let me ask you some questions, because I think, my own feeling is one of the reasons that--sort of left-wing leaders were much stronger in San Francisco than even anywhere on the West Coast was because they got inside the ILA before the '34 strike took place. So that guys like you, and [Germain] Bulcke and a few others were in a position of being recognized rank-and-file leaders. And what I'm trying to figure out is why you decided to go inside the ILA, at that time, rather than to stay on the outside, and maybe organize in the MWIU [Marine Workers Industrial Union] , or something like that? Do you remember ever talking about those alternatives?

[00:06:16] **HARRY:** No. Oh yeah, sure, we used to have all those alternatives. See us with the IWW, see us with the

Wobblies! The Wobblies were very powerful out here at the time, in the twenties. You know they had a strike in Los Angeles. That was in '23, they had a strike in Portland in '22, I think. So yeah, we considered, we discussed those—the question of the MWIU. And we organized a meeting with the leader, I believe we had one. But I think—in 1933 we made a—that's when we made the decision, with the understanding and the cooperation of the Communist Party and the leadership of the MWIU, we would've had just a longshore union.

[00:07:01] **HOWARD:** Okay, but the reason it's interesting to me is because the Communist Party line at that time—as I read it—was that we should build dual revolutionary unions, and yet, Sam Darcy, you know him?

[00:07:10] **HARRY:** Sure, yeah. Sam Darcy and I were very good friends.

[00:07:13] **HOWARD:** You were with him for quite a bit.

[00:07:14] **HARRY:** And he was a great supporter of the strike and he organized the whole thing. Yeah, he was one of the ones—he was one of the parties we met with to say we couldn't go to the MWIU route, but we built a—have a longshore union, but then we set up a federation, which we [amended?] into the Maritime American Federation of all the other unions. Then, we had a joint marine strike in '34, which included all the Waterfront unions and all the discretionary seamen.

[00:07:44] **HOWARD:** Why do you think the left-wing forces were stronger in San Francisco during the thirties than in other ports? Do you have any ideas about that?

[00:07:53] **HARRY:** I don't know. I'm not so sure I would say that. But San Francisco was a key port on the West Coast. A big, powerful port. And that's where the majority of the workers are. The biggest movement on the coast at that time was San Francisco. Now of course, in Los Angeles and their harbor down there—L.A. at that time was well-known as an [?open shop?] town. So we had our difficulties. But of course it wasn't the same, certainly it wasn't true for all the Northwest.

[00:08:20] **HOWARD:** Let me ask you one other set of questions before we leave the thirties, and that's about the attitudes of the ship owners, how would you characterize their attitudes towards the unions at that time?

[00:08:31] **HARRY:** Anti-union.

[00:08:33] **HOWARD:** You want to elaborate that a little bit?

[00:08:34] **HARRY:** Well there was a [inaudible] anti-communist drive. And there was a newspaper around there that said—a law firm around here—I forget his name there now—anyway, he was their best lawyer.

[00:08:51] **HOWARD:** [inaudible] ? Was that it?

[00:08:51] **HARRY:** What?

[00:08:51] **HOWARD:** Was it [inaudible] ? [?Nomacoe?]

[00:08:51] **HARRY:** No, no. He was pro-red. [inaudible] [?Nomaco?]

[00:08:57] **HOWARD:** Oh, you're talking about it from their stand-point, huh?

[00:08:59] **HARRY:** I'm talking about the employers, see. The ship owners and the [inaudible] [?Tom Plant?] was for the key leaders there. There was a law firm that used to represent William Randolph Hurst. And they got the anti-communist program going. When it came down to the '34 strike, they published a—in the [San Francisco] Chronicle as well as The [San Francisco] Examiner—story about the Party—that it wasn't a strike, it was a revolution, directed from Moscow. And if I took [inaudible] who was the chairman of the strike, I took my orders from Moscow.

[00:09:38] **HOWARD:** I read that stuff, yeah.

[00:09:39] **HARRY:** Right, then you know that.

[00:09:40] **HOWARD:** What did the workers think when they read that sort of stuff? Do you have any idea?

[00:09:43] **HARRY:** Well, some of them were persuaded. But we stayed with the workers down below and talked to them, and they got wise, you know [inaudible] just how it is. When San Jose, it was the—it wasn't the strike, it was a revolution. Well, then the works in [inaudible] .

[00:10:00] **HOWARD:** Okay, how about the role of the Communist Party during the Maritime Strike? How important was that role?

[00:10:06] **HARRY:** Very important, they were 100 percent in support. Very important. In a matter of fact, they had paper out here called the Western Worker and, in fact they made a maritime edition of the Western Worker about the official organization of the strike.

[00:10:26] **HOWARD:** They also handed a lot of literature, on their own, and they submitted articles to the Waterfront Worker at the time, and they were arguing about the class nature of the struggle and everything else. Do you think the workers were influenced or at all radicalized by their—

[00:10:40] **HARRY:** Well, now we did—now that was before we took over the Waterfront Worker. We had some articles because we were a bunch of editors. We all worked on the paper, there was no specific editor. We were all amateurs, you see—a little bit of help. So we're the ones that wrote those articles, and there wasn't much of that as far as I recall in the paper. If you going back—I'm talking about—

[00:11:05] **HOWARD:** Okay, yeah the Waterfront Worker, you're right, there wasn't too much in there.

[00:11:08] **HARRY:** That was after—that was before we took it over.

[00:11:10] **HOWARD:** Yeah, okay. But the Party sent out a lot of—they did leaflets on their own, I know that.

[00:11:16] **HARRY:** They were—they helped in any way. They were the ones that moved in, and they helped in any way they could. No doubt about that. They were a very, very important avenue of support.

[00:11:18] **HOWARD:** Do you think it radicalized any of the rank-and-filers?

[00:11:18] **HARRY:** Sure it did.

[00:11:18] **HOWARD:** How about the violence that was directed against the men? I know it was very extensive, especially in San Francisco during the strike.

[00:11:18] **HARRY:** Violence, yes, by the police department and by—they organized by what they called—vigilantes. And they were organized within—they had leadership from the labor movement.

[00:11:20] **HOWARD:** How did the men relate to that violence? I mean what did they think about that? It almost seemed like there was a war going on, from what I read.

[00:11:58] **HARRY:** Well they didn't budge. They were wise to what was going on. See, they were against the violence. Well, they were ready to meet it with violence. I had to tell them this was no way of doing it, you see. You had to meet them with mass strength of the strike.

[00:12:15] **HOWARD:** Did—Many times the state would intervene against the strikers, either with the National Guard or something like that?

[00:12:21] **HARRY:** No, they intervened after the big battle of July, July the fifth, when the ship owners, together with the—by that time that they started the Industrial Association, they took over operation from the strike away from the ship owners. And they were going to talk to the city government at that time, who launched a program who opened the port to them. The docks were chock-a-block with cargo by this time. Because the ships were unloaded by strike-breakers, but the stuff still stayed on the docks because the Teamsters weren't hauling. So on July the fifth, or July the third, the ship owners didn't [inaudible], but the Industrial Association or the corporation, or the city government decided to open up the port. That was on the big battle of July fifth, and that's where we had our two men killed and the big battle, and it was on that battle the mayor issued a request to call out the National Guard, which they did. They put on enough pressure. So the governor at that time, [Frank] Merriam, ordered the National Guard to come over and take over the Waterfront. Which they did.

What I'm wondering is, if I was a rank-and-file dock worker, and people have been telling me along that the state was not neutral, that we were involved in a class war, I wouldn't have believed it until I went through maybe July fifth. And saw that here, with the police being mobilized against me, and I'm a taxpayer, they're working against workers, shooting us down unarmed. I'm wondering if that had an impact on people, that maybe radicalized them also.

[00:13:51] **HOWARD:** Certainly it did. It radicalized—I had to talk to them and they wanted to go home, and when they called out the National Guard, and they wanted to go home and they got their rifles and put up a fight! And we can't do that, that's not the way to fight. We'd lose! What'd we do? And I say we go to the workers, and we have a general strike—they thought I was crazy at the time. We went after union, after union. Explain it very simple: it was a working class struggle and we had to follow, had to fight. It was more than us involved. Without a single exception we had no trouble from a single union. We had committees that went around and talked to the local unions. I had one group. We had no trouble with the rank-and-file of the union.

How about the '34 men, as they're called. Over the years it seems like they've maintained a real common identity, is that true?

[00:14:43] **HARRY:** Who?

[00:14:44] **HOWARD:** The '34 men, the guys who went through that strike. Is there any sense of commonality or common identity that they went through a struggle together, and they have this common bond?

[00:14:53] **HARRY:** Oh certainly there was.

[00:14:56] **HOWARD:** And did that persist over the years?

[00:14:58] **HARRY:** Certainly, still does to some extent.

[00:15:00] **HOWARD:** What's the basis—

[00:15:01] **HARRY:** We got a fiftieth anniversary coming up this year in July.

[00:15:03] **HOWARD:** I know, I know. What's the basis of their—this may be a dumb question--but what's their basis for their feelings of camaraderie together?

[00:15:12] **HARRY:** Because—just the general strike was enough. Certainly you come—despite the different opinions and all the rest of it, they came together because they were all fighting against a common enemy.

[00:15:25] **HOWARD:** Okay, let me ask you another set of questions that I've asked everyone and I want to get your slant on it: how come you, in particular, emerged as a rank-and-file leader during the course of the strike?

[00:15:34] **HARRY:** Because I was worker and I had a bit of a—see the—Australia at that time, see my background was in Australia. I've been a member of the seamen's union in Australia, especially near the West Coast and the reputation is that good labor country, which it was. And you see, in the strike, going back to 1916, and after I went to sea down there, in the 1919 strike, Australia was one of the first countries they appealed to for help, and obviously received it! When they were on strike, they wouldn't work ships in Australia. One of the reasons that the—one of the things that happened too, that the company union, they were able to say the ships that used to go to Australia from at least from San Francisco, had been worked by union people.

We didn't know the difference—I didn't know anything about unions when I first went to sea. So the unions down there didn't understand anything about company unions, they thought it was a regular union. So Australia

had, first of all, a reputation and a name. And me, being in Australia, I got the credit for a lot of that. So when we put together the strike committee in the joint Maritime Committee and nominations were made for chairman, I was nominated—there was no other nominations, so I kind of got it by default!

[00:16:56] **HOWARD:** You're too humble, you obviously had something besides your Australian background. I mean in some ways they can see you as an outsider too, couldn't they?

[00:17:03] **HARRY:** Oh, well I was a former—I was a member of the—I've been a member of the Australian Seamen's Union. See at that time there were two unions in the world, that had that kind of arrangement. A membership between the Australian Seamen's Union and the Sailor's Union in the Pacific was interchangeable. One of the first things I did when I came over here, because my union book in Australia wasn't active, because I was sailing in sailing ships. [inaudible] sailing ship, transferred my membership to the Sailor's Union in the Pacific. That was in 19—one of the first things I did. And then we went on strike on the East Coast, on May the first, 1921, but I'd gone down there on a ship—I'd gone there to New Orleans and went on the [inaudible] on the beach in New Orleans. And in the early part of 1921, I joined the Wobblies. It was a bit of an odd labor background there, kind of a radical one.

[00:18:05] **HOWARD:** How would you characterize the ILWU during the—well, I guess the ILA, ILWU from '33, '34 to the—

[00:18:13] **HARRY:** The ILWU was, no—we didn't take on that name, 'til we joined the CIO in 1937.

[00:18:19] **HOWARD:** I'm just thinking the politics of the organization seemed very radical after '34 till about '39 at least.

[00:18:26] **HARRY:** Sure it was.

[00:18:27] **HOWARD:** Is that a fair assessment, do you think?

[00:18:28] **HARRY:** Certainly.

[00:18:28] **HOWARD:** And do you think that it also reflected the views of the rank-and-file, or was it pretty much the leadership suggesting ideas in the rank-and-file more or less agreeing, but not caring one way or the other?

[00:18:40] **HARRY:** Oh no, the rank-and-file—the rank-and-file understood—we used a lot of effort to bring the rank-and-file along. So there was a difference of opinion between the rank-and-file, but they had different locals, yes. But on the basic issues, of hanging together to fight the employers, that was all on that.

[00:18:58] **HOWARD:** Okay, why do you think that these guys were so willing to support radical propositions, radical policies—

[00:19:03] **HARRY:** Such as what?

[00:19:05] **HOWARD:** Well, the outstanding example, I suppose was the scrap iron boycotts during '37, '38, '39.

[00:19:10] **HARRY:** Well that was understandable, because that came along—understand that Japan had invaded China. We had pictures of Japanese planes flying over China, dropping bombs on villages and things like that. And of course, we got into a lot of trouble over that boycott of Japan. Later on, well of course, you couldn't find anybody even today to say we were wrong. And our slogan at that time was, if we don't stop this

going—it wasn't only scrap iron, it was gasoline—it'll be coming back on our heads in the way of bombs. That's what we told the guy later on. And everybody knew we were right.

[00:19:50] **HOWARD:** Yeah, in retrospect, but at the time it was still a pretty radical proposition.

[00:19:54] **HARRY:** That's right. But we had to support—like [inaudible] we had the biggest Chinese group outside of China, we had their support. We had a big banquet there, in Chinatown there, where I was a key speaker and they had awarded us. The banner's still hanging down in the headquarters of the union—in the international headquarters.

[00:20:18] **HOWARD:** And there's other indicators of that radicalism too. I read articles from the thirties and they described you as the most radical leader in the world, or in the Western hemisphere.

[00:20:25] **HARRY:** Well, that was exaggerated.

[00:20:26] **HOWARD:** Maybe so but—

[00:20:26] **HARRY:** Sure we joined in. Like we joined in on the question of war, the Civil War in Spain. We supported the Spanish Republic. And we had—there was other battles like—[coughing]

I'm trying to think of some of things that came up there. One of them—

[00:20:56] **HOWARD:** There was a lot of progressive propositions.

[00:20:58] **HARRY:** There was the question of war! Don't forget there was the rise of fascism!

[00:21:03] **HOWARD:** Okay, that leads me to the next set of questions, about the Second World War, that's what I'm writing on right now, to tell you the truth. You were very famous in some circles, and infamous in others for some of your statements that you made during the war, about I guess the most famous one is, "We have to turn the unions into instruments of the speed-up." Do you remember that?

[00:21:21] **HARRY:** Say it to me—what was that again?

[00:21:23] **HOWARD:** Nobody remembers it, including Rosco [Craycraft], who was the International Vice-President—you said, now this is the quote, you said that "the union has to be turned into an instrument of the speed-up to prosecute the war effort at home."

[00:21:34] **HARRY:** I never said that.

[00:21:35] **HOWARD:** You don't remember that?

[00:21:35] **HARRY:** Well, I never said that—nothing ever in those words, but in effect what I said was, that all other struggles had to come secondary. The war to be first. And we had to get in there, and give it everything we had. We put the thing into effect, so we got down to—I remember we were turning around the ship a day, we turned around a ship of the company in a day.

[00:21:59] **HOWARD:** Did it involve a speed-up on the part of the actual work process itself or do you—?

[00:22:05] **HARRY:** I think it depends on what you mean by speed-up.

[00:22:07] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I guess it does.

[00:22:08] **HARRY:** Now, a speed-up, you see don't forget—increasing the tonnage handled for an honest wage be done without a speed-up. We didn't allow speed-up. We observed all the rules, and we got extra men to work, and increased the amount of tonnage output.

[00:22:29] **HOWARD:** How about—

[00:22:30] **HARRY:** Without speed-up.

[00:22:31] **HOWARD:** Okay, without speed-up then. So it was basically an increase in efficiency then?

[00:22:35] **HARRY:** Absolutely.

[00:22:37] **HOWARD:** Okay. Did you give up any work rules that you can recall?

[00:22:41] **HARRY:** Nope.

Well, maybe they weren't as strictly enforced as before, but no, we preserved all the rules and protected the guys and called upon them to put their best efforts in to help them win the war because that came first, and they supported it, with some exceptions of course. But the big bulk of them responded quite willingly.

[00:23:03] **HOWARD:** What about—

[00:23:04] **HARRY:** That's a number of records you could go check what they—I had a meeting with the commander of the West Coast, commander of the army, and spoke and so forth. That—we worked in terms with the army and the navy.

[00:23:18] **HOWARD:** That's my impression. The reason why I'm asking is because, one of the explanations of the why the left is unable to divide the Cold War in some unions, like the UE [United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America] and the UAW [United Auto Workers] in particular, is because they gave up so much during the war. That they didn't protect the workers and as a result, after the war, when the government started traveling against the communist, the workers said, "Yeah, these guys didn't defend us during the war, so why should we defend them now?" And I can't see much evidence of that in the ILWU and it seems pretty much—

[00:23:43] **HARRY:** True, there were wasn't. The guys knew what they were doing. And they knew what the program was, the alliance with the war and so forth. Like we came up with, for example, I went back [inaudible] , like the SeaBees [C.B.s or construction battalion] that was our idea.

[00:24:02] **HOWARD:** Was that the longshore battalions?

[00:24:05] **HARRY:** That's right. That was our idea too.

[00:24:09] **HOWARD:** Was there any opposition to an emphasis on production during the war?

[00:24:14] **HARRY:** Where, with us?

[00:24:15] **HOWARD:** Yeah, on the West Coast?

[00:24:16] **HARRY:** Not to—yeah there was opposition, sure. But not to—it didn't bother us. You're talking about the Waterfront? I don't know about the—

[00:24:22] **HOWARD:** Yeah, right, the Waterfront.

[00:24:23] **HARRY:** Yeah, there was some, but nothing that seemed to be effective. As far as I recall.

[00:24:29] **HOWARD:** Can you tell me who the opposition was likely to be? I don't want names, I just want—I mean were they like left-wing radicals? Or were they—

[00:24:35] **HARRY:** Yeah, in some cases, sure.

[00:24:37] **HOWARD:** Like Trotskyists basically?

[00:24:38] **HARRY:** Sure.

[00:24:39] **HOWARD:** And how about the new workers that came into the Union themselves? I know San Francisco's Local grew out to 10,000 members at one point during the war. Who were the guys recruited into the longshore industry during the war? What kinds of people were they?

[00:24:55] **HARRY:** They came in. We had a rank-and-file committee doing all that. I wasn't directly involved with that because that part of the CIO—actually, when we joined the CIO, I was the West Coast director made by [John L.] Lewis, you see. So all that stuff was mostly handled by a local guy, the Coast—we had a Coast Longshore Committee as the most directly involved. So we had no great trouble there.

[00:25:22] **HOWARD:** Okay. And let me ask you about one incident I read in [Charles P.] Larrowe's book, and I heard about it talking to guys down here in Local 13, when you came down to Local 13, and there was beef over the number of cement sacks on a sling load? Remember that?

[00:25:39] **HARRY:** I don't remember, but it sounds all right.

[00:25:41] **HOWARD:** Well it was something about you were arguing if there should be an increase of twenty to twenty-two sacks or something like that. The workers said no. Do you remember anything else of that incident?

[00:25:51] **HARRY:** Nope. It could be, it could have happened.

[00:25:54] **HOWARD:** I mean in any event, it wasn't a major struggle in your mind between the union's position and the rank-and-file or anything like that?

[00:25:59] **HARRY:** Well, think it through yourself. Here are a bunch of guys down there, and if we had—the idea was to have coastwise rules. Those roles were meant—like they weren't local. So, if you had a cement load of twenty-two sacks, with ten sacks of difference, that was out of order.

[00:26:20] **HOWARD:** So that's what I've been told by other folks. So really, what was happening in [San] Pedro [Los Angeles, California] is that they had a lower level there—lower sling limit than the rest of the coast. Is that right?

[00:26:28] **HARRY:** I don't think so, that's—no.

[00:26:33] **HOWARD:** Then what was your position?

[00:26:34] **HARRY:** If that's true, I don't remember.

[00:26:35] **HOWARD:** Okay, I'll have to check your records on that and find information, it's just hard to find.

[00:26:38] **HARRY:** We had a program. In 1936 we organized a sling load limit. It was put in, it was written in the contract. And that included the stacks—stacked rows of sugar, and cement, and everything else. And that's the way it was pledged as part of the deal with the employers, it was part of work then, we pledged to enforce that at each port. Now if they decided, [inaudible] and this could be likely that they were going to go below the coastwise sling load limit, see we'd report that.

[00:27:09] **HOWARD:** Okay, let's move into the post-war period briefly, and as you know, a lot of the unions—the left-wing unions—weren't able to survive that period without major defections from the rank-and-file. There were the expulsions from the CIO in 1950—

[00:27:25] **HARRY:** Well that's what did it, yeah.

[00:27:27] **HOWARD:** And the ILWU was the only union that survived that period without any major defections from the rank-and-file as I read the history. Why do you think that was so?

[00:27:37] **HARRY:** Because we're a rank-and-file union.

[00:27:39] **HOWARD:** The UE wasn't a rank-and-file union?

[00:27:42] **HARRY:** The UE was a rank and file union, but they had a little different situation there. They had another union already in the field—led by [James B.] Carey, you know.

[00:27:48] **HOWARD:** You had the ILA here, of course.

[00:27:50] **HARRY:** No, we didn't have the ILA here.

[00:27:52] **HOWARD:** Well, didn't they make some attempts?

[00:27:53] **HARRY:** And we got kicked out of the CIO, the CIO set up another union or tried to and it didn't work. So we survived those attacks.

[00:28:02] **HOWARD:** But that's—see that's one of the original questions of the research is—

[00:28:06] **HARRY:** My reason was because we were a rank-and-file union. And owned by the union, and because we had all kinds of slogans such as—we didn't have a treasury, or treasuries were always kept a part of the rank-and-file. So the lawsuits didn't bother us at all.

[00:28:25] **HOWARD:** That's—when I asked everyone else, and they seemed to give me the same sort of an answer, that the union delivered the goods and that it was a rank-and-file union.

[00:28:32] **HARRY:** That's right.

[00:28:33] **HOWARD:** And I can accept that, it makes sense to me. But it doesn't explain why other unions who were the same way, didn't survive.

[00:28:39] **HARRY:** I don't know that—I don't want to get into that, that would take a little too much. I wouldn't want to give any opinions from the top of my head. I have to do research, and I don't want to do it.

